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Abstract 
This paper examines the heterogeneous market in which economic agents of different information-processing abilities interact. In 
the theoretical framework, the market is composed of three different types of agents, “sophisticated” agents with rational 
expectations, “naive” agents with adaptive expectations, and Bayesian agents endowed with learning abilities. The behavior of 
these agents in the context of an important economic problem of nominal price adjustment after a fully anticipated one-time 
negative monetary shock is examined. If sophisticated agents with their perfect foresight find it profitable to imitate the biased 
behavior of naive agents, then the interaction of agents exhibits strategic complementarity. Thus the naive agents will have a 
disproportionately large effect on sluggish price adjustment towards equilibrium. However, the introduction of Bayesian agents 
with learning abilities into the market will have a compensatory effect by mitigating the price rigidity. Since Bayesian learning is 
allowed in heterogeneous market, Bayesian agents that first start as naive will undergo a learning process to become sophisticated 
after a certain period. In conclusion, the proportion of naive agents decreases in favor of sophisticated agents as depicted in the 
simulation model.  As a result, the price adaptation towards equilibrium is accellerated. 
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Istanbul University. 
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1. Introduction 
In macroeconomic models of heterogeneous market structure, agents’ information-processing abilities to form 
expectations differ from each other. The implications of heterogeneity are examined in macroeconomic models that 
exhibit an environment of strategic complementarity. The concept of “strategic complements” plays a key role in 
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investigating the behaviors of agents that are divided into two categories. The first category comprises the 
sophisticated agents that are assumed to form rational expectations. The second category comprises naive agents that 
are considered to have adaptive expectations. If macroeconomic interaction between these two types of agents 
follows a course of action that has a disproportionately large effect on macroeconomic equilibrium then the 
environment exhibits strategic complementarity. In heterogeneous markets, sophisticated and naive agents are mixed 
and interact in a strategic environment. If strategic substitution is valid between different types of agents, then the 
expectational errors of naive agents will be corrected by sophisticated agents. The adjustment process to equilibrium 
after fully anticipated one-time shock will follow a path similar to that of a homogeneous market in which only 
sophisticated agents exist. However, if sophisticated agents find it profitable to imitate naive agents, then strategic 
complementarity will take place between market participants. Strategic complementarity offers an explanation of 
limited rationality as a source of both nominal and real inertia. 
 
 The macroeconomic implications of heterogeneity in terms of agents’ abilities to process information and form 
expectations in an environment of strategic complementarity are considered by papers dealing with Keynesian 
coordination problems. Since heterogeneous expectations cause serious theoretical problems under the rational 
expectations hypothesis, the different views of modern Keynesians and Lucasians are still central to contemporary 
macroeconomic debate (Blinder, 1987). Recent economic literature on this debate develops agent-based behavioral 
modeling of micro foundations of macroeconomics. Therefore, in this paper, we compare two economic systems: 
Keynesian system of non-neutrality and Lucasian system of neutrality of money. Keynesian coordination problems 
cause backward price rigidity and heterogeneous expectations are one of the reasons behind coordination problems. 
Our model explains price-setting phenomenon in a strategic oligopolistic market structure in which different types of 
agents with heterogeneous expectations interact. As a solution to Keynesian coordination problems, we show that the 
introduction of rational learning agents into the market lowers the level and shortens the duration of nominal inertia. 
We use the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) of learning and this is a new approach in the relevant economic 
literature. 
2. Literature Review 
One of the most important economic problems to date is the macroeconomic implications of the effect of nominal 
price adjustment after a fully anticipated and exogenous monetary shock. The phenomenon of nominal price 
stickiness is examined by macroeconomists to explain nominal inertia as a source of monetary non-neutrality. In 
relevant literature, considerable attention is paid to informational frictions (Lucas, 1972), menu costs (Mankiw, 
1985), and the theory of wage contracts (Fischer, 1977). But the sources and effects of nominal inertia are still 
controversial among economists and the phenomenon is not yet clearly explained. 
 
The theoretical works on the Keynesian coordination problems include Diamond (1982), Bryant (1983), Heller 
(1984), Akerlof and Yellen (1985a,b), Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989), Russell and Thaler (1985), Cooper 
and John (1988), Ball and Romer (1991). These papers provide a theoretical analysis for the role of strategic 
interaction between market participants which is a source of coordination failure and nominal rigidity in various 
contexts. For example, Diamond (1982) shows the relevance of strategic complementarity when search frictions 
with positive trading externalities are taken into account. Bryant (1983) deals with informational frictions. 
 
 Under the heterogeneous expectations assumption, the explanation to limited rationality given by the 
Haltiwanger-Waldman approach is due to the disproportionate effect of naive agents on the persistence of 
disequilibrium after a fully anticipated one-time shock. Since naive agents have adaptive expectations and follow the 
rule-of-thumb, establishment of new equilibrium position will be slow. On the other hand, sophisticated agents that 
forecast the actions of naives will imitate their behavioral bias because of strategic complementarity. Bulow, 
Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) originally developed the concept of strategic complements and substitutes. 
 
The heterogeneity regarding the ability of agents to forecast is fundamental to the analysis of the Haltiwanger-
Waldman approach formalized by Evans and Ramey (1992) and Sethi and Franke (1995). Naive agents that follow 
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the rule-of-thumb have less ability to forecast and are thereby subject to expectational errors. Although sophisticated 
agents have “traditional” rational expectations, they find it profitable to imitate the behavioral bias of naives and the 
interaction of agents in the market exhibits strategic complementarity. The introduction of even a small number of 
naive agents into the market will have a disproportionately large effect on the equilibrium position of the economy. 
Bomfim (2001) used a dynamic general equilibrium model to extend the Haltiwanger-Waldman approach. 
According to Bomfim “the work of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989) brought a new perspective to the 
analysis of forecast heterogeneity” (Bomfim, 2001, p. 146). 
 
 However, in the macroeconomic models of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) and Bomfim (2001), the element 
of time is taken as exogenous. The element of time can be endogenized in the model only by taking into 
consideration the learning behavior of different types of agents. According to Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) and 
Bomfim (2001), agents differ in terms of their abilities to form expectations and they don’t undergo a learning 
process. Hence their model is not actually ‘dynamic’. Agents with adaptive expectations obey their adaptive nature 
for all periods before and after the shock. Beside their limited ability to forecast, they have no ability to learn, and 
this is unrealistic. As Boland wrote “Unless the model builder is willing to recognize simultaneously many different 
ways to process information—that is, many different learning strategies little progress can be expected in a realistic 
way. Recognizing learning can help solve the problem of time’s arrow since one cannot unlearn” (Boland, 2005, p. 
129). 
 
The more realistic model with the element of time taken endogenously and thereby really dynamic is only 
possible by the introduction of learning agents into the market. This aspect allows us to dynamize the model. 
Bayesian learning is examined by Arrow and Green (1973) and Jacobs and Jones (1977). However, these models are 
not set in a strategic environment. Cyert and DeGroot (1971, 1974) develop an oligopoly model in which the 
concept of Bayesian learning is introduced. Dosi et al. (2001) is a comprehensive study of learning in evolutionary 
environments. 
 
There is an increasing interest in the learning models of economic agents in relation to the theory of expectations. 
For example, Branch (2004) develops a model of rationally heterogeneous expectations with which agents form 
their forecasts of inflation. Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) analyses the conditions for convergence of adaptive 
learning towards rational expectations equilibrium. Kalai and Lehrer (1993) show that rational learning leads to 
Nash Equilibrium. On the other hand, there is also a cognitive cost to form rational expectations as examined by 
Evans and Ramey (1992, 1998) and Brock and Hommes (1997). The principle of expectation formation depends on 
the cost-benefit analysis of the sophisticated agents acting upon the adaptive agents. Therefore, the windfall profit 
rate due to price changes caused by monetary shocks is an important motive. 
The importance of heterogeneous expectations is shown by the recent macroeconomic literature. For example, 
Anufriev et al. (2009) uses the stylized macro model of Howitt (1992) to investigate inflation dynamics and 
examines the agents with heterogeneous expectations that update their beliefs based on past performance of prices. 
 
The experimental model of Fehr and Tyran (2008) is based on the theoretical work by Haltiwanger and Waldman 
(1989). But the psychological content of their paper is money illusion and anchoring. Fehr and Tyran (2008) 
examine the effect of a strategic environment on agents’ decision making problem. Zandt and Vives (2007) analyze 
interim beliefs in a framework of comparative statics. Potters and Suetens (2009), motivated by Haltivanger and 
Waldman (1985, 1989) and Fehr and Tyran (2008), assert that there is significantly more collusion (cooperation) 
under strategic complementarity than under strategic substitutability in a laboratory experiment. However, 
experimental analyses designed in a laboratory with computerized subjects are criticized for being far from real life 
practices of economic agents. 
3. The Dynamic Bayesian Model of Expectations and Strategic Complementarity 
In this section we analyze the effect of strategic complementarity on price adjustment after fully anticipated one-
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time monetary shock in a dynamic macroeconomic model with Bayesian expectations. There are three types of 
agents in the population and they are assumed to be risk neutral. Naive agents have adaptive expectations with 
limited abilities whereas sophisticated agents have rational expectations in the “traditional” sense; i.e., they have 
unlimited abilities to forecast future prices and they know the structure of the economy with all its relevant 
parameters. The third type of agents has Bayesian expectations with additional abilities to learn. In the case of 
oligopolistic price competition, if a firm sets its price above the Nash equilibrium level, then the other competitive 
firms will also set their price above the Nash equilibrium level (Potters and Suetens, 2009). Strategic 
complementarity within the context of oligopolistic competition results in Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. And 
the degree of strategic complementarity will vary according to subjective preferences for conditional cooperation. 
For example, a negative monetary shock induces sophisticated agents to imitate the naives’ biased behavior in favor 
of profit opportunities, and thereby nominal prices are kept high over certain periods of time after the shock is 
implemented. But the introduction of learning agents with Bayesian expectations mitigates the price persistence 
since the proportion of naive agents decreases over time as they learn by doing how to forecast the forecasts of other 
agents to restore Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a strategic interaction and finally become sophisticated with perfect 
foresight. Learning agents with Bayesian expectations will start the course as naive agents and then undergo a 
‘hidden’ (learning) Markov process to end up with sophisticated agents. Since the only possible way to endogenize 
the time element into a real dynamic model is to include a learning process, we use a state-space Hidden Markov 
Model (HMM) of learning with dynamic Bayesian approach which serves best for the purpose and this is a new 
approach in the relevant economic literature. Learning agents with Bayesian expectations starting as naive will 
undergo a mutation through certain states and finally be sophisticated. The effect of this learning process is to 
mitigate the disproportionate impact of naive agents on Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
3.1. The model specification and methodology 
Consider a market environment consisting of n agents. The proportion of sophisticated agents in the population 
is denoted by q while the proportion of naive agents is 1 – q. Learning agents are those that begin as naive and then 
become sophisticated. For this reason, they have an effect on changing the proportion of naive to sophisticated 
agents. The profit function of agent i at time t is defined as ,i t?  and it’s formulated as follows 
 
, , , ,( , , )i t i t i t i tP P M? ? ??                            (3.1.1) 
 
where ,i tP  denotes agent i’s nominal price at time t, whereas ,i tP?  represents nominal average price for the rest of 
the population n – 1 and M is the nominal money supply. To avoid money illusion, it’s assumed that the profit 
function is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to individual and average prices as well as money supply. The 
price expectation of a particular agent eiP depends on the average price of other agents iP?  so that they have to form 
expectations on the basis of forecasting the average price forecast of population. This implies that the sophisticated 
agents imitate the naive agents’ biased behavior in an attempt to gain unduly profit from conditional cooperation. 
The introduction of learning agents with Bayesian expectations allows naives to learn this process and share the 
profit, and thereby quicken the price adjustment towards Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Naive agents with limited 
abilities to forecast have adaptive expectations about future prices and this assumption is formulated as a general 
extrapolative expectations model: 
 
, 1 1 2 2 ...
e
i t t t l t lP P P P? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?            (3.1.2) 
 
where 1 2 ... l? ? ?? ? ?  such that 1 1
l
jj
?
?
?? . In a dynamic model, there are l past periods. Naive agents do 
not take into account the current information. They only form their expectations by backward-looking adaptive 
behavior and because of this their choices are biased. The factor of price revision is denoted by ? parameter in 
(3.1.2). 
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 The information set for the sophisticated agents with rational expectations includes the current information 
denoted by t? . If ? denotes possible information available for an agent i, then ( )iI ? represents agent i’s 
information and ???  contains the knowledge of actions in the past and present. For sophisticated agents to 
imitate naives, all past and present information are required and contained in the equation below (Bergin and 
Bernhardt, 2004). 
 
1 1( , ) [( , ),..., ( , )]t t t l t l? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?           (3.1.3) 
 
On the other hand, Bayesian learning behavior is based on naive agents’ expectations and their own 
experience ( )iI ? , so their information set must include their own recent history of actions and profits: 
 
          , 1 , 1 , ,( ) [( , ),..., ( , )]i i t i t i t l i t lI ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ??                   (3.1.4) 
 
A Bayesian agent updates its beliefs as it learns from new information set included in its own experience in 
each period. A naive agent becomes Bayesian as it begins to learn from new flows of information and updates its 
price estimates towards new equilibrium level in every period and behaves like a sophisticated agent with rational 
expectation when making forecasts (Cogley & Sargent, 2005). This updating behavior of Bayesian agents is 
represented in the price forecasts by the parameter ?  in equation (3.1.2). Every new period, updated price estimates 
by the Bayesian agents make the forecasts rational and thereby price deviation decreases. 
3.2. The Bayesian vectorautoregressive model in the form of price expectations 
The Bayesian Vector Autoregressive (BVAR) function can be used in the form of an expectation model to 
analyze the state-space Hidden Markov Model of learning and the effect of strategic interaction between agents in a 
heterogeneous market. A variety of expectation formation models can be derived from the general form of the 
extrapolative expectations model (3.1.2) such as adaptive expectations, static expectations, and Bayesian 
expectations by utilizing some specific computational codes for the parameter ? on an ad hoc basis. 
 We can rewrite (3.1.2) in a typical VAR model in the form of a price vector to derive the function of Bayesian 
expectations formation: 
 
, 1 1 2 2 ...i t t t l t l t tP P P P z? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?              (3.2.1) 
 
where ,i tP  is a 1n?  vector of endogenous variables (past prices) fort the i’th agent and n is the number of agents in 
the market. The sequence of parameter ?  is set in descending order 1 2 ... l? ? ?? ? ?  such that 1 1
l
jj
?
?
?? . 
t?  is 1n?  vector of error terms independently, identically and normally distributed with zero mean and variance-
covariance matrix ? , . . (0, )t i i d? ?? ; ? s are n n?  and n d?  matrices of parameters respectively and tz  is a 
1d ?  vector of exogenous variables, i.e. price expectation of particular agent i at time t. To state Bayes rule for the 
learning process of the agents, equation (3.3.1) can be transformed into a Bayesian VAR model: 
 
,i t t tP X ?? ? ?                              (3.2.2) 
 
where t is a discrete time unit t = 1, . . ., T. tX  is the Kronecker product of 1( )n tI W ??  that is n nk?  where 
1 1( ,..., , )t t t l tW P P z? ? ?? ? ??  is 1k ? . 1 2( , ,..., , )lvec ? ? ? ?? ?  is 1nk ?  (Ciccarelli & Rebucci, 2003). Unknown 
parameters of the model; i.e., 1 2( , ,..., , )lvec ? ? ? ?? ?  and ?  are contained in the information set of (3.1.4) 
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and they are updated in every period by the direct observation of the individual agent whose expectations are 
Bayesian. 
3.3. Modeling dynamic Bayesian learning 
We use the state-space Hidden Markov Model (HMM) for analyzing the Bayesian learning process. The HMM 
allows us to study the heterogeneous market with different types of agents endowed with different learning abilities. 
The existing research on learning is based on static model of agent behavior with the standard learning curve 
framework. The HMM captures the dynamic learning behavior of individual agents, their own experience and also 
their interaction with other agents in the market by explicitly setting the dynamics of heterogeneous market 
structure. Therefore the HMM has important advantages over the standard learning curve framework (Singh, T. & 
Youn, 2011). HMM comprises of finite set of hidden (unobserved) learning states and observed outcome and it 
processes past and present actions of individual agents in a strategic environment to analyze learning dynamics. In 
our model, since the only strategic variable is price, the outcome for each of the learning states will be the observed 
price. Therefore the HMM provides some information about the sequence of states. States are hidden in the HMM in 
contrast to the simple Markov model where states are directly observed. However, the only difference between the 
HMM and a simple Markov model is the introduction of learning agents and the transition from one state to another 
follows the usual Markov process. 
 
 In a particular period, a hidden state transforms into an observed outcome (actual price) through the learning 
process. Thereby in a dynamic Bayesian market network of strategically interacting agents, a particular agent 
transits from one state to another by its own learning behavior. The first-order Markovian process follows a 
transition from one learning state to another where subsequent learning state depends on the present learning state. 
Let the set of learning states is given by 1{ , ,..., }t t t lS S S S? ??  where tS  is the highest state and t lS ?  is the 
lowest state of learning. The observed (actual) Bayesian Nash equilibrium price at time t is generated by the learning 
process that is hidden from the agent at the relevant state, tS . A particular state sequence for agent i is 
, , 1 ,{ , ,..., }i i t i t i t lS S S S? ??  and the corresponding sequence of actual prices (observed outcomes) is arrived at by 
agent i after the transition from a prior state to a present one through learning. Thereby, the locus of interim 
Bayesian Nash equilibria that corresponds to the learning curve are the path of price inertia between the pre-shock 
and after-shock Nash equilibrium level. 
3.3.1. The specification of state-space hidden Markov model  
 
In our model, the probability distribution of the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) of a sequence of states and 
observed outcomes (actual prices) is defined by lth order Markov process. Extending a first-order Markov process to 
lth order allows us to model higher order interactions between expected and actual prices. In an lth order Markov 
model, we define the set of prices as 1{ , ,..., }t t t lP P P P? ?? . Price observations are dependent on a set of learning 
state variables tS  in the HMM. Given the sequence of states of lth order of Markov process, tS  is determined by 
the set of states 1{ ,..., }t t lS S? ?  which is independent of S?  for ?  < t – n. The factorization of the joint probability 
distribution function (? ) of sequence of states (S) and price (P) observations for the state-space lth order HMM is 
as follows: 
 
1: 1: 1 1 1 1
2
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ,..., ) ( )
T
T T t t t l t t
t
S P S P S S S S P S? ?
?
? ? ? ? ? ??               (3.3.1.1) 
 
where 1:TS  means 1,...,S T . The state transition probability of lth order of Markov process with a deterministic 
state variable and a stochastic variable can be written as; 
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            1( ,..., )t t t t l tS f S S w? ?? ?                   (3.3.1.2) 
 
The probability of observed price conditional upon the state variable can also be written with a stochastic variable as 
follows (Ghahramani, 2001). 
 
             ( )t t t tP g S v? ?                      (3.3.1.3) 
 
Bayesian learning starts with some prior knowledge about the parameters and price observations in the form of 
prior probability distribution over sequence of price observations and the relevant parameters. This prior knowledge 
is updated by using price observations in the past and present to obtain a posterior probability distribution function 
over future prices and parameters. In order to compute the expected price of agent i, , 1
e
i tP ? , a sequence of price 
observations in the past and present is used. The expected price as a function of current and past prices with their 
relevant parameters is formulated as follows: 
 
          , 1 0 , 1 , 1 ,( ) ...i t i t i t l i t lf P P P P? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?                 (3.3.1.4) 
 
And the Bayesian prediction function representing the posterior probability distribution of expected price is 
 
           ( ) ( ) ( , )f P f P P S dP?? ??                  (3.3.1.5) 
 
The expected price depends on learning state variables and parameters of the price variable. The Bayesian 
prediction function (3.3.1.5) averages over the uncertainty in price expectations and in the parameters (Ghahramani, 
2001). Bayesian learning agents in our model use the Bayesian prediction function (3.3.1.5), which is normally 
distributed. Each learning agent uses its own price observations in the market and its own learning states in the 
strategic interaction with other agents to calculate parameters that are weighted average of distributed lag model 
(3.3.1.4). 
3.3.2. Parametrization and simulation of the model 
 
The parameters of the Bayesian price expectation formation equation (3.3.1.4) are generated according to our model 
structure on an ad hoc basis by using the forward-backward algorithm that we have created by writing codes in 
Mathematica 8.0. The forward-backward algorithm is applied to the Bayesian learning from strategic interaction of 
agents with heterogeneous expectations in a market network corresponding to a Hidden Markov Model 
(Ghahramani, 2001). The forward pass recursively computes the parameter of strategic price variable t?  defined as 
the joint probability of tS  and the sequence of future price observations from 1tP?  to t lP? . The backward pass 
computes the conditional probability of past and present price observations from tP  to t lP?  given tS  (Ghahramani, 
2001). The time is symmetric between the forward pass and backward pass. In our Hidden Markov Model, there are 
9 learning states (l = 9) within 10 time periods (t = 10) and 10 representative agents (n = 10) each of which is 
indexed as i = (1, 2,. . ., n). The choice of the integer 10 for the number of representative agents will allow us to 
interpret the simulation results in percentage terms as we change the market composition of different types of agents 
to compare the effects of strategic complementarity in the next section. Every agent transits from 9 learning states 
with 9th degree of Markov process: 
 
1 9( ,..., )t t t tS f S S? ??                    (3.3.2.1) 
 
In the 10th period, learning agents become sophisticated. Every agent assigns higher learning states to the near past 
and lower learning states to the distant past in the time horizon. So the parameters are weighted accordingly. The 
587 Volkan Hacioglu /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  195 ( 2015 )  580 – 591 
price observation in a particular period of an agent is based on learning state of the agent, and the price expectation 
of the next period is based on the parameter of the strategic price variable. We generate 9 random real numbers on 
an ad hoc basis that range between 0 and 0.3 as learning parameters for the revision of price expectations in the 
simulation model. The range of the numbers is selected according to the magnitude of nominal shocks implemented 
in the simulation. In compliance with the distributed lag model, the sum of the weighted averages of parameters 
equals 1 which is also a threshold for learning. If the sum of these 9 real numbers is less than 1, then the 10th 
parameter is obtained by subtracting the sum of 9 parameters from 1. When the total sum of price parameters for a 
learning agent reaches the threshold of the highest learning state and be 1, the Bayesian learning agent becomes a 
sophisticated agent with rational expectations. 
 
The expected price functions of a learning agent i are formulated for  9 learning states as follows: 
 
, 1 0 10 , 1 , 1 9 , 9( ) ...
e
i t i t i t i tP P P P? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ?                          (3.3.2.2) 
, 2 0 10 9 , 1 1 , 8 , 8( ) ...
e
i t i t i t i tP P P P? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?                         (3.3.2.3) 
, 3 0 10 9 8 , 2 1 , 1 7 , 7( ) ...
e
i t i t i t i tP P P P? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?                       (3.3.2.4) 
   .   .  .  .   .  .  .  . 
   .   .  .  .   .  .  .  . 
   .   .  .  .   .  .  .  . 
, 9 0 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 , 8 1 , 7 1 , 1( ) ...
e
i t i t i t i tP P P P? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?       (3.3.2.5) 
 
The equations (3.3.2.2), (3.3.2.3), (3.3.2.4), . . ., (3.3.2.5) with 9 learning states construct a Learning State Transition 
Matrix for each agent. The expected price for a learning agent at time 1t ?  is the weighted average of observed 
prices for 9 learning states. The calculated expected price at time 1t ?  enters into the price expectation equation at 
time 2t ?  and the price observation of distant past 9t ?  is omitted from the equation at time 2t ? . This 
conforms with the behavioral aspect of forgetting. The 9th degree of Markov process goes cumulatively throughout 
9 learning states in the same sequence. When an agent transits from the highest 9th level of learning state to 10th 
period forward in the future ( 10t ? ), the agent’s price expectation equation becomes equivalent to the rational 
expectations equation: 
 
? ?, 10 0 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 , 10ei t i tP P? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                (3.3.2.6) 
 
where the price expectation of an agent i instantaneously adapts to the actual rational equilibrium price in the 
market. In other words, at the period 10, the learning agent becomes sophisticated and sets its expected price at 
rational equilibrium level. 
4. The Effect of a Fully Anticipated One-Time Monetary Shock 
In this section, we examine the effect of a fully anticipated one-time monetary shock on the price adjustment 
process in a strategic complementarity of mixed agents. There are three kinds of agents that interact and differ from 
each other in terms of their abilities to form expectations. According to this assumption, sophisticated agents with 
rational expectations dominate the market whereas naive agents with adaptive expectations have biased behavior. In 
this case, existence of even a small number of naive agents is enough to have large effect on price adjustment and to 
slow it down towards equilibrium. However, the introduction of Bayesian agents into a heterogeneous market with 
strategic complements dynamizes the model and mitigates the sluggishness of price adjustment. 
 
In order to compare how the degree of strategic complementarity changes when the market composition changes 
with different sizes of fully anticipated one-time monetary shocks, we designed two different market structures with 
1 0.90q ?  and 2 0.60q ? ; i.e., the proportion of sophisticated agents in the population is 90 percent in the first 
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market and 60 percent in the second market. In the simulation of the learning process, the naive agents with learning 
abilities use the Bayesian prediction function (3.3.1.5) to become sophisticated after a certain period of time. In a 
price-setting model, all agents are informed about the shock at the beginning of the post-shock period t + 1. In the 
pre-shock period t – 1, money supply 0M is given, and then at period t a fully anticipated exogenous negative 
monetary shock is implemented. The degree of strategic complementarity is associated with the profit size as a 
percentage of price and the form of profit function with respect to price is assumed to be linear such as 
 
0 1( )t tP P? ? ?? ?                 (4.1) 
 
In respect to this assumption, increasing profit size will increase the degree of strategic complementarity. The 
stronger the strategic complementarity, the longer the price adjustment process will be. However, as the profit size 
increases, Bayesian actors’ incentive to learn more quickly will increase as well. So they will rapidly transform from 
being naive to become sophisticated and thereby alleviate the effect of nominal inertia on price adjustment. 
5. Simulation Results of the Model 
In this section, we investigate the simulation results of a fully anticipated one-time monetary shock to the 
economy. Although Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) deals with the real side of the economy with a hypothetical 
production project of economic agents, they indicate in their paper that fully and even relatively anticipated nominal 
monetary shocks have real effect due to the biased behavior of naive agents. The implications of nominal shocks and 
their effects on the real output corresponds to the price persistence caused by the interaction of sophisticated and 
naive agents in a heterogeneous market. 
5.1. The adjustment of prices 
In before-shock periods, the economy is in a steady state. After a fully anticipated one-time shock, the behavior 
of the naive agents with adaptive expectations is to move slovely to the new equilibrium level. Since the price 
persistence is associated with a windfall profit, sophisticated agents will use the biased behavior of navies in their 
favor to reap the reward. Therefore, the price persistence will linger for longer than that within a homogeneous 
market in which only sophisticated agents exist. However, the introduction of Bayesian agents will have a 
compensatory effect on the price deviation from equilibrium. Given the presence of Bayesian agents, the 
convergence of the prices to the new equilibrium level in post-shock periods will be faster. Agents that were naive 
just after the post-shock periods will learn the dynamic characterization of price adjustment by counteracting the 
imitation of the sophisticated agents. 
 
In the simulation model, the economy is in a steady state with the pre-shock equilibrium average price level *0P  
= 5 and the nominal money supply 0M = 200. In the first scenario depicted in Figure 1, the economy experiences a 
fully anticipated one-time negative monetary shock exogenously at the 10th period. The shock is implemented by 
decreasing the money supply 80 percent from the steady state level of 200. The post-shock money supply 
0
1 5
MM ?  is 40 and the post-shock equilibrium average price level is *1P = 1. This corresponds to a relatively high 
level of profit rate due to the price change ( P?  = 4) and it’s expressed as a first derivative of the profit function 
1( )tP? ?? ?  in (4.1). The profit rate 1?  also indicates the degree of strategic complementarity in the market. 
Therefore as the profit rate increases, the proportion of sophisticated agents in the market increases too. Because 
profit rate is an incentive for sophisticated agents to participate in the market and set themselves in a strategic 
interaction with naive agents. Hence, in the first scenario, the proportion of the sophisticated agents is 90 percent 
due to the relatively high level of profit. 
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[ P?  = 4 and q = 0.90] 
Fig. 1. The Effect of A Fully Anticipated One-Time Negative Monetary Shock 
 
In the second scenario depicted in Figure 2, the magnitude of the shock is smaller than the first scenario. 
Again, the economy is in a steady state at the pre-shock equilibrium average price level *0P  = 5 and the nominal 
money supply 0M = 200. But this time the shock is implemented by decreasing the money supply by 30 percent 
from the equilibrium level of 200 at the 10th period. The post-shock money supply 1M  is 140 and the post-shock 
equilibrium average price level is *1P = 3.5. Since there is a relatively small size of profit ( 1? ) as a function of price 
change ( P? = 1.5), the incentive for sophisticated agents to imitate the naive agents will be less. In this case, the 
degree of strategic complementarity is low. 
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[ P?  = 1.5 and q = 0.60] 
Fig. 2. The Effect of A Fully Anticipated One-Time Negative Monetary Shock 
In this dynamic simulation model, analytical characterization of price convergence to post-shock equilibrium 
depends on the windfall profit caused by the price disturbance and the introduction of Bayesian agents with learning 
abilities into the market. After the one-time shock, if the market is homogeneous in which only sophisticated agents 
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exist with rational expectations, then their forecast will be perfect and the price convergence to post-shock 
equilibrium level will be instantaneous. However, the existence of even a small number of naive agents will have a 
disproportionately large effect on price persistence (Haltiwanger & Waldman, 1989). This effect is important 
especially for the first post-shock periods. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper the heterogeneous market structure in a strategic environment is examined. The heterogeneous 
market is composed of three different types of agents in terms of their abilities to form expectations. Firstly, 
sophisticated agents with perfect foresight have rational expectations. Secondly, naive agents have adaptive 
expectations for they are prone to make systematic errors because of their backward-looking nature. And thirdly, 
Bayesian agents are endowed with learning abilities. They start as naive and end up with becoming sophisticated. In 
this manner, they compensate the disproportionate effect of naive agents on sluggish price adjustment in favor of 
sophisticated agents. The strategic interaction between these three types of agents was examined in the context of 
the adjustment of nominal prices after a fully anticipated one-time negative monetary shock. The bounded 
rationality attributed to the adaptive agents plays an important role in this model. Starting with a steady economy at 
a before-shock equilibrium level of prices, an exogenous negative monetary shock is implemented in a certain 
period. In search of the price adjustment process after the shock, we analyzed the strategic interaction of market 
participants. 
 
Under strategic complementarity, sophisticated agents have an incentive to mimic the biased behavior of naive 
agents because they find it profitable. After the shock, the naive agents’ biased behavior is predicted and imitated by 
sophisticated agents, and thereby the price adjustment process slows down considerably. The degree of strategic 
complementarity plays a key role in this framework and it is expressed in terms of profit rate, which is a function of 
price change. If the magnitude of profit rate increases, the incentive for the sophisticated agents to take strategic 
action in the market is also increased. As more sophisticated agents enter into the market, learning and price 
adjustment process will be accellerated. Since a little rate of windfall profit from price change due to monetary 
shock will attract only limited number of sophisticated agents, a small deviation from equilibrium level of prices is 
more prone to price persistence than a big deviation. The introduction of Bayesian agents with learning abilities has 
a counter effect on the nominal inertia. The learning agents observe the strategic environment and accordingly 
update their information in every period, and use this experience to form gradually more accurate price forecasts. 
Naive agents become Bayesian in this stepwise updating of beliefs, and they process information to form rational 
expectations. As a result, the percentage of naive agents decreases in favor of sophisticated agents and the prices 
converge more quickly to the post-shock equilibrium level. 
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